Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, 3rd Edition, Harvard University Press (1980), p. 44
Excerpt:
As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries—not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.
Via Galen Strawson, in “Reply to Hocutt,” Philosophical Books (1996), where he wrote, “Materialism, after all, is a metaphysical hypothesis. As such it is, as Quine memorably observed, ‘comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer’.”
